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and the second s

vergons systems in Cube and through US vertification setisty 9. 8. and etc.

QAS countries this in fact done and does not recer.

- 2. Although four days have now possed since understanding reached and U Thank has made best effects, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov reps in MI and Cuba to W and UN without element of verification.

 which in view history of this affair US regards as essential.
- 3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICHC act as IN agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we smould promptly as yet bill In affect with or Tibel Other ogreeneed Part or instructions on this will come later today). It also promptly a locate Statement Statement of the Internal Court of the Statement of the Internal Court of the In

Cleared w/ white House: McG.Bundy 8/3 - Mr. Brubeck

Cleared w/ White House: McG.Rmdy
The Secretary (in substance)
DOD/Mr. Bitze

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agreement, p.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday.

- h, on question verification USI has expressed villinguas accept wide range of possible US arrangements but there does not jet appear likelihood even any set of people one he implemented.
- 5. President's responsibility for WS security demands that in absence UN verification, WS undertake whetever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate to this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is assurance to WS and IA public.
- 6. Thus, although such less satisfactory than W varification on the ground and from the air with cooperation flows and Cuba, W must in elemental interests of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in as unprovecative a manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unsured aircraft. While WS accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that somhisticated weapons and control systems,
- including SAM's, do not require participation of Sov technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If We reconneissence aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect We aircraft will arise. We might thus those a cycle of action and reaction which would put us bed? where we were last week. Thus of utnost importance flows immediately take measures
- is clear in co sring all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use UNCT.

 This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegadly under Cub a control. The President considers Ebrushchev's reply of October 28 as clear.

7. Second sentence of President's letter to Chairman Ehrushchev of October 2

to assure recommaissance sircraft not fired on.

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Litery technicians sport to the process to the proc

erident's undertaking against invasion is an adequate assurable that these

 The President particularly desires that there should be RPF no discussion of wider issues from our side until the offensive vesnous in

tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we ak forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on smything else will we have successfully put in operation the Lemman-Ehrushchev agreement on a present matter.